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Abstract
Quantum information studies how information is encoded and decoded in quantum me-
chanical systems. In this paper, we study the basic scenario where two classical bits are en-
coded into a quantum state. We prove a “learning lemma,” which provides a new upper bound
on the average probability of decoding each bit that depends on the probability of learning the
XOR of the two bits. Moreover, we give bounds on how well each bit can be decoded when
their XOR is hidden and generalize these concepts to strings.
Our learning lemmata have strong connections to cryptography and nonlocality. In partic-
ular, we show a set of equivalences between secure oblivious transfer protocols, CHSH-type
games, and quantum encodings hiding the XOR. These equivalences allow us to use results in
one area to prove results in another. For example, we use information bounds to give bounds
on the values of CHSH-type games and also on the “correctness” of certain secure oblivious
transfer protocols. We also use results of quantum XOR games to show that secure oblivious
transfer admits perfect parallel repetition. Last, our learning lemmata enable us to improve the
lower bounds on the cheating probabilities of any quantum oblivious transfer protocol.
1 Introduction
Quantum information studies how information is encoded and decoded in quantum mechanical
systems. There are many examples where encoding information in quantum states can be much
more efficient than classical ones. For example, one can use the fact that an n-dimensional quantum
system has an exponential description in order to “encode” 2n classical bits in it, for example in
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a quantum fingerprint state [BCWdW01]. However, quantum information does not always offer
some advantage, since the uncertainty principle postulates that every time an external observer
measures a quantum system, the state of the system collapses after the measurement and some
information may become irretrievable. This intricate interplay between these two properties has
been at the basis of some of the most fundamental results in quantum information, from quantum
encodings, to non-locality, and to quantum cryptography.
Our goal is to study the relation between these areas and provide new insight on the power and
limitations of quantum information, by looking at it through these various lenses. After describing
in more detail the different concepts that we study, we prove some precise quantitative equivalences
between them and provide a number of applications.
1.1 Quantum encodings and learning the XOR
One of the fundamental results in quantum information is Holevo’s theorem [Hol73] which, in
high level, says that if one wants to transmit classical information, then encoding the classical
information into quantum bits is no more efficient than encoding it into classical bits. In other
words, classical information cannot be compressed using quantum information. The same negative
result holds for the weaker task that is referred to as Random Access Codes. Here, one is looking
for an encoding of n classical bits into a quantum state, where each bit can be decoded with high
probability from a single copy of the encoding (but not necessarily all of them at the same time).
Again, quantum encodings are no more efficient than classical ones [Nay99].
However, the extraordinary power of quantum information has been proven in a variety of mod-
els: for example, in communication complexity, there is a number of distributed tasks, where quan-
tum encodings are exponentially more efficient than classical ones [BCWdW01, BJK04, GKK+08,
RK11]. Moreover, it is possible to encode two classical bits in one quantum bit such that either bit
can be correctly decoded with probability cos2(pi/8), see [BBBW83, ANTV99].
Let us focus on the following simple scenario: The quantum state ρx0,x1 encodes two classi-
cal bits x0 and x1 that are drawn from some known distribution. Imagine there exists a decoding
procedure (i.e. a quantum measurement) to decode x0 that provides the correct answer with prob-
ability p0 and a different decoding procedure that decodes x1 with probability p1. We would like
to analyse the average decoding probability, i.e. the quantity (p0 + p1)/2.
One way to bound this quantity is through entropic uncertainty relations, which can provide
upper bounds on this probability that depend on the decoding procedures but not on the encoding
(see for example [OW10]). For example, if the first decoding procedure is a measurement in the
computational basis and the second in the Hadamard basis, it is easy to see that no matter what
quantum encoding we use, there is always some entropy in the distribution of outcomes of these
two measurements. This, in turn, implies that the average decoding probability cannot be 1.
Here, we study the average decoding probability by relating it to the probability of decoding
some other function f(x0, x1) of the bits, for example the one that outputs both bits or their XOR.
Classically, it is straightforward to relate the probability of decoding f(x0, x1) to the probabilities
of decoding each bit xi. If one has some partial information about (x0, x1) then it is easy to find
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the optimal guess for (x0, x1). However, the situation is more delicate in the quantum world.
Suppose we try to determine f(x0, x1) by decoding each bit xi. Once the first bit is decoded,
the encoding collapses to some eigenstate of the decoding operator, hence the probability of then
correctly decoding the second bit may have changed. In other words, getting information about x0
could destroy the information about x1.
We provide new upper bounds on the average decoding probability of two classical bits that
depend on the probability of correctly decoding both bits or the XOR of the two bits. We also
extend these results to strings and discuss their relation to complementarity.
Theorem 1 (XOR learning lemmata) Let {ρx0,x1 : x0, x1} be a quantum encoding of two classi-
cal bits (or bit strings) x0, x1 drawn from some known probability distribution. Denote the average
decoding probability of x0 and x1 by c := 12 Pr[learning x0] + 12 Pr[learning x1]. Then
1. Pr[learning x0 ⊕ x1] ≥ (2c− 1)2 when x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1},
2. Pr[learning x0 ⊕ x1] ≥ c(2c − 1)2, if c ≥ 1/2, when x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}n.
In fact, Pr[learning (x0, x1)] ≥ c(2c − 1)2, if c ≥ 1/2, when x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}n.
The probability of learning a value is defined as the maximum over all decoding procedures of
the probability that the output of the decoding procedure is equal to the correct value.
As a consequence of the previous theorem, in the case where the probability of learning x0⊕x1
is exactly 1/2, i.e. the encoding reveals no information about the XOR, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 (Hidden XOR lemmata) Let {ρx0,x1 : x0, x1} be a quantum encoding of two clas-
sical bits (or bit strings) x0, x1 drawn from some known probability distribution. If the encoding
reveals no information about x0 ⊕ x1, then
1. 12 Pr[learning x0] +
1
2 Pr[learning x1] ≤ cos2(pi/8) when x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1},
2. 12 Pr[learning x0] +
1
2 Pr[learning x1] ≤ 12 + 1√2n+1 when x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}
n
.
In order to prove the above theorems, we study how the distribution of the measurement out-
comes changes when we perform the two measurements sequentially on the same quantum state.
We say that two measurements are perfectly complementary if after having performed the first
measurement, no more information can be extracted by performing the second measurement on
the post-measured state. On the other hand, they are non complementary if after measuring with
one, the probabilities of the outcomes of the second are unaffected (which is the case for classical
measurements). For example, the measurements on the computational and Hadamard bases are
complementary while the measurements on different subsystems of a product state are non com-
plementary. Our theorems provide a quantitive way of studying the notion of complementarity (see
Appendix A). We also show how our lemmata are related to a number of fundamental properties
of quantum information, including non-local games and quantum cryptographic primitives.
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1.2 The CHSH game
The CHSH game is a well-known tool for studying quantum non-locality and the power of en-
tanglement [CHSH69]. It is a game between Alice and Bob who initially share a quantum state
and are not allowed to communicate any further. Alice receives a random x ∈ {0, 1} and outputs
a ∈ {0, 1}. Bob receives a random y ∈ {0, 1} and outputs b ∈ {0, 1}. The value of the game,
denoted ω∗(CHSH), is the maximum probability that a ⊕ b = yx, which can be proven to be
strictly higher than the value when Alice and Bob do not initially share any quantum state.
One can recast the CHSH game in the framework of quantum encodings and show that the value
of the game is equal to Bob’s average decoding probability depending on whether he receives y = 0
or y = 1. For example, once Alice receives x and measures to learn a, the post-measured state Bob
has is an encoding of a and x. We can thus write the value of the game as
Pr[Bob receives y = 0]Pr[Bob outputs b = a] +Pr[Bob receives y = 1]Pr[Bob outputs b = a⊕x]
which can be rewritten as
1
2
Pr[Bob can learn a] + 1
2
Pr[Bob can learn a⊕ x].
Note also that the non-signalling condition of the CHSH game says that the probability that Bob
can guess Alice’s input is 1/2 can be equivalently stated as the fact that the maximum probability
of correctly decoding the XOR of a and a⊕x (the two bits Bob wishes to learn in this case) is 1/2.
With this perspective, we can see how the CHSH game is related to quantum encodings where the
XOR is hidden.
In [OW10], they explore this idea further by providing some close relations between special
types of uncertainty relations and the value of the CHSH game in quantum but also more general
theories.
1.3 Oblivious transfer
Oblivious transfer is a fundamental cryptographic primitive, where Alice sends to Bob one of two
bits (x0, x1) but is oblivious to the bit Bob receives. We wish to design protocols to accomplish the
following three (conflicting) tasks: Alice cannot learn which bit is received by Bob, Bob cannot
learn the XOR1 of Alice’s two bits, Bob learns the correct value when both parties are honest.
Let us define OTp with cheating probabilities as follows (formal definitions of all primitives
and games used in this paper can be found in Section 2):
• Alice outputs (z0, z1) and Bob outputs (b, w), where z0, z1, b are uniformly random bits and
w = zb with probability p,
1Note that most definitions enforce the stronger condition on cheating Bob, that he has no (or very little) information
about Alice’s other bit (instead of the XOR of her bits). However, in the classical world, if Bob cannot guess the XOR
then he does not know one of the two bits [DFSS06]. In the quantum world, we show that this definition of cheating
Bob relates directly to the CHSH game.
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• AOT is the maximum probability Alice can guess b without being caught cheating,
• BOT is the maximum probability Bob can guess z0 ⊕ z1 without being caught cheating,
• A protocol is secure if AOT = BOT = 1/2 and perfect if p = 1.
Oblivious transfer was first introduced as a “multiplexing channel” by Wiesner [Wie83] al-
though the cryptographic relevance was not known at the time. It was first used in a cryptographic
sense by Rabin [Rab81] as a way to share secrets. Rabin’s version of oblivious transfer was not
exactly as described above, however it was shown to be equivalent by Cre´peau [Cre´87]. Oblivious
transfer is a fundamental primitive because it can be used to construct arbitrary secure function
evaluation protocols [Kil88].
There are many quantum protocols for variants of oblivious transfer [BBBW83], [DFSS08],
[WST08], [Sch10], [Sik12], [CKS13]. In particular, [BBBW83] showed a secure protocol where
Bob gets the correct value with probability cos2(pi/8). On the other hand, when Bob gets the
correct value with probability 1, then Alice or Bob can cheat with probability 58.52%, independent
of what function of (x0, x1) Bob wishes to learn [CKS13].
In this paper, we are using the stand-alone definition of oblivious transfer, which does not
guarantee composability. This makes our lower bounds on the cheating probabilities stronger, and
in addition, this definition highlights the relations between non-locality, cryptography, and quantum
encodings.
To further discuss composability, let us consider a non-interactive OTp protocol where Alice
sends to Bob a quantum encoding and Bob can choose which bit to learn by measuring in a partic-
ular basis. Consider using such a protocol to accomplish the following cryptographic task, known
as imperfect Rabin OT (the perfect version was introduced in [Rab81]), as follows:
• Alice and Bob use a non-interactive OTp protocol so that Bob learns zb with probability p.
• Alice sends to Bob a random bit c and outputs the value zc. If b = c, Bob outputs zc (with
probability p). If b 6= c, he outputs #.
We see that Bob need only delay his choice of b (and his measurement) to always learn zc with
probability p. If Bob was forced to measure at the end of the OTp protocol, before learning c, then
he would know zc (with probability p) only if c = b. Therefore, the protocols we consider in this
paper, even if secure and non-interactive, are not necessarily composable. It should be clear that our
goal is to relate this cryptographic primitive to non-local games and the notion of complementarity
of quantum measurements, and not to construct real-life security systems.
We now examine how the correctness is related to the security of oblivious transfer. In partic-
ular, we answer the question of whether it is possible to sacrifice a little security for the sake of
gaining much correctness by showing a lower bound curve relating the three quantities p, AOT,
and BOT.
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Theorem 3 (Lower bound curve for imperfect oblivious transfer) For any OTp protocol, the
correctness parameter p and cheating probabilities AOT and BOT satisfy
p ≤ AOT
(√
BOT + 1
)
.
When we set AOT = BOT = 1/2, we get that for secure protocols p ≤ cos2(pi/8), which is
attainable by the secure protocol mentioned above in [BBBW83]. Therefore, the curve contains
the point corresponding to the largest correctness of a secure oblivious transfer protocol. However,
not every point on this curve is optimal. If we set p = 1, i.e., the protocol is perfect, we get that
max{AOT, BOT} ≥ 56.98%. In fact, we prove a stronger lower bound of 59.9% as well as extend
the bound of 58.52% to oblivious string transfer, denoted OTnp , which is the same as OTp, except
Alice outputs n-bit strings instead of single bits.
Theorem 4 (Security lower bounds on perfect oblivious transfers) In any perfect OT1 proto-
col, one party can cheat with probability at least 59.9%. Also, for any n ∈ N and any OTn1
protocol, one party can cheat with probability at least 58.52% regardless of the function of Alice’s
two strings Bob wishes to learn.
This shows that the security of perfect oblivious transfer cannot be amplified to get arbitrarily
close to 50% without sacrificing some correctness. The proofs of the above two theorems are
similar to the lower bound proof in [CKS13] and are detailed in Appendix B.
1.4 Equivalences between CHSH games and secure OT protocols
The learning and hiding lemmata appear to have strong connections with non-local games as well as
cryptographic primitives. In Section 4, we make this explicit and prove (or in some cases reprove)
some bounds for CHSH-type games as well as variations of quantum oblivious transfer. In fact,
we prove two equivalences, each involving three different notions: quantum information theory,
quantum games, and quantum cryptography. The first equivalence we prove involves quantum
encodings hiding the XOR of two strings; the primitive OTnp ; and the game CHSHn, where Alice
receives random x ∈ {0, 1}n and outputs a ∈ {0, 1}n , Bob receives random bit y ∈ {0, 1} and
outputs b ∈ {0, 1}n, and they win if ai ⊕ bi = y xi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (the XOR is bitwise
and y xi is scalar multiplication). Formal definitions of the games and primitives can be found in
Section 2.
Theorem 5 (Equivalence of secure OTn
p
and CHSHn strategies) The following four statements
are equivalent for every n ∈ N:
1. There exists a set of quantum states {ρx0,x1 : x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}n} and a probability distribution
{pix0,x1 : x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}n} such that when given ρx0,x1 with probability pix0,x1:
Pr[learning x0 ⊕ x1] = 1
2n
and 1
2
Pr[learning x0] +
1
2
Pr[learning x1] = p;
6
2. There exists a secure, non-interactive OTnp protocol;
3. There exists a secure OTnp protocol;
4. There exists a strategy for CHSHn that succeeds with probability p.
We also prove another equivalence between quantum encodings of n pairs of bits hiding each
XOR; OT⊗np , the n-fold parallel repetition of oblivious transfer; and CHSH⊗n, the n-fold parallel
repetition of CHSH. Again, p is the correctness parameter of the oblivious transfer protocol.
Theorem 6 (Equivalence of secure OT⊗n
p
and CHSH⊗n) The following four statements are equiv-
alent for every n ∈ N:
1. There exists a set of quantum states {ρx0,x1 : x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}n} and a probability distribution
{pix0,x1 : x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}n} such that when given ρx0,x1 with probability pix0,x1:
Pr[learning x0 ⊕ x1] = 1
2n
and 1
2n
∑
c∈{0,1}n
Pr[learning xc] = p,
where xc is the string with i’th bit being the i’th bit of the string xci;
2. There exists a secure, non-interactive OT⊗np protocol;
3. There exists a secure OT⊗np protocol;
4. There exists a strategy for CHSH⊗n that succeeds with probability p.
Note that in our equivalences, apart from translating the learning probabilities, we conserve the
notions of security/non-signalling/hidden XOR through the reductions and we also deal with the
interactivity and aborting of oblivious transfer protocols.
In related work, Wolf and Wullschleger [WW05] showed that PR-Boxes, imaginary boxes
that win the CHSH game with probability 1, are equivalent to perfect secure oblivious transfer.
However, there is a timing issue as pointed out in [BCU+05] that makes the OT non-composable.
Our results also extend these connections to the quantum world.
1.5 Applications of the equivalences
Our equivalences provide new ways of looking at quantum cryptographic primitives, quantum non-
local games, and quantum encodings. They also allow for interesting, or even surprising, conse-
quences. One reason is that we can use previous results in one area to prove bounds in another.
For example, instead of proving a bound directly for oblivious transfer, one could use a bound for
CHSH to obtain a bound for oblivious transfer. Take for example the semidefinite programs used
to show perfect parallel repetition of XOR games [CSUU08]. These seem to have no connections
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with interactive oblivious transfer protocols, however they are intricately linked through our second
equivalence result and therefore can be used to say something about oblivious transfer.
Using Theorem 2 and the equivalences in Theorem 5, we have an alternative proof of the
optimality of CHSH and an upper bound on CHSHn. We discuss the optimality of our bound on
CHSHn in Appendix D.
Corollary 1 (Bounds on CHSH and CHSHn) For any n ∈ N, ω∗(CHSHn) ≤ 12 + 1√2n+1 . Fur-
thermore, ω∗(CHSH) ≤ cos2(pi/8), which is attainable by [CHSH69].
Moreover, we have the following bounds on secure oblivious transfer.
Corollary 2 (Bounds on OTn
p
and OTp) For any n ∈ N, the correctness of any secure OTnp
protocol satisfies p ≤ 12 + 1√2n+1 . Furthermore, the correctness of any secure oblivious transfer
protocol OTp must satisfy p ≤ cos2(pi/8), which is attainable by [BBBW83].
Using perfect parallel repetition of CHSH [CSUU08], we have the following corollary of The-
orem 6.
Corollary 3 (Perfect parallel repetition of oblivious transfer) For any n ∈ N, the correctness
of any secure OT⊗np protocol satisfies p ≤ (cos2(pi/8))n, which is attainable by using n instances
of a secure OTcos2(pi/8) protocol. That is, secure oblivious transfer admits perfect parallel repeti-
tion.
On the other hand, we get another variation of the hiding lemma when the XOR of Alice’s two
strings are hidden.
Lemma 1 (Hidden XOR string lemma, version 2) Let {ρx0,x1 : x0, x1} be a quantum encoding
of two classical n-bit strings x0, x1 that are drawn from some known probability distribution. If
the encoding reveals no information about x0 ⊕ x1, then
1
2n
∑
c∈{0,1}n
Pr[learning xc] ≤
(
cos2(pi/8)
)n
.
2 Cryptographic primitives and quantum game definitions
We give formal definitions of the cryptographic primitives and quantum games used in this paper.
Definition 1 (Imperfect oblivious transfer) A quantum oblivious transfer protocol with correct-
ness p, denoted here as OTp, is an interactive protocol, with no inputs, between Alice and Bob
such that:
• Alice outputs two independent, uniformly random bits (z0, z1) or Abort and Bob outputs
uniformly random bit b and another bit w or Abort.
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• If Alice and Bob are honest, w = zb with probability p (for either value of b) and neither
party aborts.
• If p = 1 we say the protocol is perfect.
We say that the oblivious transfer protocol has cheating probabilities AOT and BOT where
• AOT := Pr[Alice can learn b without Bob aborting],
• BOT := Pr[Bob can learn z0 ⊕ z1 without Alice aborting],
• If AOT = 1/2 and BOT = 1/2 we say the protocol is secure.
The choice to have the information as outputs instead of inputs is for convenience since Alice
and Bob can always derandomize their outputs while retaining the same cheating probabilities
(see [CKS13] for details).
Definition 2 (Imperfect oblivious string transfer) A quantum oblivious string transfer protocol
with correctness p, denoted here as OTnp , with cheating probabilities AOTn and BOTn , is defined
analogously to an imperfect oblivious transfer protocol except z0 and z1 are n-bit strings. We say
an OTnp protocol is secure if AOTn = 1/2 and BOTn = 1/2n, noting that Bob wishes to learn
z0 ⊕ z1.
Definition 3 (n-fold repetition of oblivious transfer) A quantum n-fold repetition of oblivious
transfer protocol with correctness p, denoted here as OT⊗np , with cheating probabilities AOT⊗n
and BOT⊗n , is defined analogously to an imperfect oblivious string transfer protocol except b is
an n-bit string (so zb takes values from each of Alice’s strings according to b). We say an OT⊗np
protocol is secure if AOT⊗n = 1/2n and BOT⊗n = 1/2n, noting that Bob wishes to learn z0 ⊕ z1.
Definition 4 (Imperfect coin flipping) A quantum coin flipping protocol with correctness p, de-
noted here as CFp, is an interactive protocol, with no inputs, between Alice and Bob such that:
• The protocol is aborted with probability 1− p when Alice and Bob are honest.
• If the protocol is not aborted, then they both output a randomly generated bit c.
We say that the coin flipping protocol has cheating probabilities ACF and BCF where
• ACF := maxc∈{0,1} Pr[Alice can force Bob to accept outcome c],
• BCF := maxc∈{0,1} Pr[Bob can force Alice to accept outcome c].
Definition 5 (Bit commitment) A quantum bit commitment protocol, denoted here as BC, is an
interactive protocol with no inputs, between Alice and Bob, with two phases:
• Commit phase: Bob chooses a random b and interacts with Alice to commit to b.
9
• Reveal phase: Alice and Bob interact to reveal b to Alice.
• If the parties are honest, Alice accepts the value of b and neither party aborts.
We say that the bit commitment protocol has cheating probabilities ABC and BBC where
• BBC :=
∑
b∈{0,1}
1
2 Pr[Bob can force Alice to accept outcome b],
• ABC := Pr[Alice can learn b after commit phase].
Note that the roles of Alice and Bob are usually inverted, however this definition is more
convenient for the analysis in this paper.
Definition 6 (CHSHn game) The CHSHn game is a game between Alice and Bob where:
• Alice and Bob are allowed to create and share an entangled state |ψ〉 before the game starts.
Once the game starts, there is no further communication between Alice and Bob.
• Alice receives a random x ∈ {0, 1}n and Bob receives a random y ∈ {0, 1}.
• Alice outputs a ∈ {0, 1}n and Bob outputs b ∈ {0, 1}n.
• Alice and Bob win if ai ⊕ bi = y xi, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The value of the game, denoted here as ω∗(CHSHn), is the maximum probability which Alice and
Bob can win.
The CHSH game is the special case when n = 1 (we omit the subscript 1 in this case).
Definition 7 (n-fold repetition of CHSH) An n-fold repetition ofCHSH, denoted here asCHSH⊗n,
is a game between Alice and Bob where:
• Alice and Bob are allowed to create and share an entangled state |ψ〉 before the game starts.
Once the game starts, there is no further communication between Alice and Bob.
• Alice receives a random x ∈ {0, 1}n and Bob receives a random y ∈ {0, 1}n.
• Alice outputs a ∈ {0, 1}n and Bob outputs b ∈ {0, 1}n.
• Alice and Bob win if ai ⊕ bi = xi yi, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The value of the game, denoted here as ω∗(CHSH⊗n), is the maximum probability which Alice and
Bob can win.
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3 Learning and hiding lemmata
3.1 Proofs of theorems
In order to prove Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we need the following claim about performing two
projective measurements in sequence that could be of independent interest.
Claim 1 Let |ψ〉 be a pure state and {C, I −C} and {D, I −D} be two projective measurements
such that
cos2(α) := ‖C|ψ〉‖22 ≥
1
2
and cos2(β) := ‖D|ψ〉‖22 ≥
1
2
.
Then we have
cos2(α − β) ≥ ‖CD|ψ〉‖22 + ‖(I − C)(I −D)|ψ〉‖22 ≥ cos2(α+ β).
Proof We first prove the lower bound. Define the following states
|X〉 := C|ψ〉‖C|ψ〉‖2
, |X ′〉 := (I − C)|ψ〉‖(I − C)|ψ〉‖2
, |Y 〉 := D|ψ〉‖D|ψ〉‖2
, |Y ′〉 := (I −D)|ψ〉‖(I −D)|ψ〉‖2
.
We have |ψ〉 = cos(α)|X〉 + sin(α)|X ′〉 = cos(β)|Y 〉 + sin(β)|Y ′〉. Since |X〉 is an eigen-
vector of C , we can write C = |X〉〈X|+ΠC and similarly we can write I−C = |X ′〉〈X ′|+ΠC′ ,
such that
〈ΠC , |X〉〈X|〉 = 〈ΠC′ , |X〉〈X|〉 = 〈ΠC , |X ′〉〈X ′|〉 = 〈ΠC′ , |X ′〉〈X ′|〉 = 0.
We now write
|Y 〉 = γ0|X〉+ γ1|X ′〉+ γ2|Z〉
where ‖|Z〉‖2 = 1, 〈X|Z〉 = 〈X ′|Z〉 = 0 and |γ0| =
√
x0, |γ1| = √x1, and |γ2| = √x2 for some
x0, x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1]. Using this expression for |Y 〉, we have
‖CD|ψ〉‖22 = cos2(β) ‖C|Y 〉‖22 = cos2(β)
(
x0 + x2 ‖ΠC |Z〉‖22
)
.
Since |ψ〉 = cos(α)|X〉 + sin(α)|X ′〉 = cos(β)|Y 〉+ sin(β)|Y ′〉, we can write
|Y ′〉 = γ′0|X〉 + γ′1|X ′〉+ γ′2|Z〉
with |γ′0| =
√
x′0, |γ′1| =
√
x′1, and |γ′2| =
√
x′2 for some x′0, x′1, x′2 ∈ [0, 1]. Using this expression
for |Y ′〉, we have
‖(1− C)(1−D)|ψ〉‖22 = sin2(β)
∥∥(1− C)|Y ′〉∥∥2
2
= sin2(β)
(
x′1 + x
′
2 ‖ΠC′ |Z〉‖2
)
.
Notice that
1 = ‖C|Z〉‖22 + ‖(I − C)|Z〉‖22 = ‖ΠC |Z〉‖22 + ‖ΠC′ |Z〉‖22 .
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We define A := ‖ΠC |Z〉‖22 = 1− ‖ΠC′ |Z〉‖22. This gives us
‖CD|ψ〉‖22 + ‖(1− C)(1−D)|ψ〉‖22
= cos2(β)
(
x0 + x2 ‖ΠC |Z〉‖22
)
+ sin2(β)
(
x′1 + x
′
2 ‖ΠC′ |Z〉‖22
)
= cos2(β) (x0 + x2A) + sin
2(β)
(
x′1 + x
′
2(1−A)
)
= cos2(β)x0 + sin
2(β)
(
x′1 + x
′
2
)
+A
(
cos2(β)x2 − sin2(β)x′2
)
= cos2(β)x0 + sin
2(β)
(
1− x′0
)
+A
(
cos2(β)x2 − sin2(β)x′2
)
. (1)
Define A(ρ, σ) := arccosF (ρ, σ) to be the angle between two states ρ and σ, which is a metric
(see p. 413 in [NC00]). Since 〈Y |Y ′〉 = 0, we have
A(|Y ′〉, |X〉) ≥ pi/2−A(|X〉, |Y 〉).
This implies that√
x′0 = cos
(
arccos |〈Y ′|X〉|) ≤ cos (pi/2− arccos√x0) = sin (arccos√x0) = √1− x0.
This yields x′0 ≤ 1− x0. Also, notice that 〈ψ|Z〉 = 0, which implies that
〈Z| (cos(β)|Y 〉+ sin(β)|Y ′〉) = 0
⇐⇒ cos2(β)|〈Z|Y 〉|2 = sin2(β)|〈Z|Y ′〉|2
⇐⇒ cos2(β)x2 = sin2(β)x′2.
This gives us the bound
‖CD|ψ〉‖22 + ‖(1− C)(1−D)|ψ〉‖22 ≥ x0. (2)
To conclude, we have
arccos(
√
x0) = A(|X〉, |Y 〉) ≤ A(|X〉, |ψ〉) +A(|ψ〉, |Y 〉) ≤ α+ β,
yielding x0 ≥ cos2(α + β) which concludes the proof of the lower bound.
For the upper bound, we have x′0 ≤ 1− x0 and cos2(β)x2 = sin2(β)x′2, hence,
‖CD|ψ〉‖22 + ‖(1−C)(1−D)|ψ〉‖22 ≤ 1− x′0,
from (1). We now show 1− x′0 ≤ cos2(β − α). Since
√
x′0 = |〈Y ′|X〉|, we have
arccos
(√
x′0
)
= A(|Y ′〉, |X〉) ≤ A(|X〉, |ψ〉) +A(|Y ′〉, |ψ〉) = pi/2− (β − α).
so √
x′0 ≥ cos(pi/2 − (β − α)) = sin(β − α) =⇒ 1− x′0 ≤ cos2(β − α),
as desired. 
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Proof of Theorem 1 The proof of the first statement in the theorem relies on the following decod-
ing strategy: First, we apply the decoding procedure for learning the first bit and then we apply the
second decoding procedure on the post-measurement state. The probability of decoding the XOR
is the probability that both decoding procedures succeed or they both fail.
We prove the theorem using the following (equivalent) setting. We suppose two parties, Al-
ice and Bob, share a joint pure state |Ω〉AB such that Alice performs a projective measurement
M = {Mx0,x1}x0,x1∈{0,1} on A to determine x0 and x1 and the post-measured state is Bob’s en-
coding of x0 and x1. Let pi be the maximum probability that Bob can learn bit xi, for i ∈ {0, 1}.
We note that without loss of generality, Bob can perform a projective measurement to guess the
value of xi with maximum probability [NC00]. Let P = {P0, P1} be Bob’s projective measure-
ment that allows him to guess x0 with probability p0 = cos2(α) ≥ 12 and Q = {Q0, Q1} be Bob’s
projective measurement that allows him to guess x1 with probability p1 = cos2(β) ≥ 12 (these
measurements are on B only). Consider the following projections (on A⊗ B):
C =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗ Px0 and D =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗Qx1 .
C (resp. D) is the projection on the subspace where Bob guesses correctly x0 (resp. x1) after
applying P (resp. Q). Consider the strategy where Bob applies the two measurements P and Q
one after the other to learn (x0, x1), from which he can calculate x0 ⊕ x1. If both guesses are
correct or if both guesses are incorrect then his guess for x0 ⊕ x1 is correct.
Let Bob perform the following projective measurement to learn both bits
R = {Rx0,x1 := Qx1Px0Qx1}x0,x1∈{0,1}.
The measurement where Bob guesses both bits correctly when applying R is
E =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗Rx0,x1 = DCD
with outcome probability 〈Ω|E|Ω〉 = ‖CD|Ω〉‖22. The measurement where Bob guesses both bits
incorrectly when applying R is
F =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗Rx¯0,x¯1 = (I −D)(I − C)(I −D)
with outcome probability 〈Ω|F |Ω〉 = ‖(I − C)(I −D)|Ω〉‖22. With this strategy, Bob can guess
x0 ⊕ x1 with probability
||CD|Ω〉||22 + ||(I − C)(I −D)|Ω〉||22 ≥ cos2(α+ β)
by Claim 1. Note that
c :=
p0 + p1
2
=
cos2(α) + cos2(β)
2
≥ 1
2
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and by Claim 3 (in Appendix C), we have cos(α + β) ≥ cos2(α) + cos2(β) − 1. From this, we
conclude that
Pr[Bob can learn x0 ⊕ x1] ≥ cos2(α+ β) ≥ (2c − 1)2.
For the second statement, ideally, we would like to extend our proof approach from bits to
strings, but unfortunately this statement is not true anymore if x0 and x1 are strings. Instead, the
analysis in [CKS13] can be generalized to strings to show
Pr[learning (x0, x1)] ≥
(
cos2(α) + cos2(β)
2
)
cos2(α+ β).
If c ≥ 1/2, then by Claim 3 (in Appendix C), we have Pr[learning (x0, x1)] ≥ c(2c − 1)2. The
statement about the XOR follows directly from the above statement. 
Proof of Theorem 2 By rearranging the XOR learning lemma for bits, we have
1
2
Pr[learning x0] +
1
2
Pr[learning x1] ≤ 1
2
+
1
2
√
Pr[learning x0 ⊕ x1].
Setting Pr[learning x0 ⊕ x1] = 1/2 yields the first statement of the theorem.
For the string version, we know that if the encoding reveals no information about x0 ⊕ x1,
then Pr[learning x0⊕ x1] = 12n . If c := 12 Pr[learning x0] + 12 Pr[learning x1] ≤ 1/2, the theorem
statement is clearly true. If c ≥ 1/2, we get Pr[Bob guesses x0⊕x1] ≥ c(2c−1)2 from Theorem 1.
This yields
1
2n
= Pr[learning x0 ⊕ x1] ≥ c(2c − 1)2 ≥ 1
2
(2c− 1)2
which implies c ≤ 12 + 1√2n+1 , as desired. 
Note that this bound for strings is not tight. In particular, for n = 1, this bound gives us c ≤ 1
instead of cos2(pi/8) ≃ 0.854. However, the probability goes exponentially fast to 1/2 as n grows.
3.2 Applications
Using Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we prove some new lower bounds for oblivious transfer. We
first prove Theorem 3 by showing how to construct an imperfect coin flipping protocol from an
imperfect oblivious transfer protocol.
Protocol 1 (CFp from OTp)
1. Alice and Bob perform the OTp protocol so they have outputs (z0, z1) and (b, w) respectively.
2. If no one aborted, then Alice sends randomly chosen d ∈R {0, 1} to Bob.
3. Bob sends b and w to Alice.
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4. If zb from Bob is inconsistent with Alice’s bits then Alice aborts. Otherwise, they both output
c = b⊕ d.
We see that this is a CFp protocol since when both players are honest, there is a 1− p chance
of aborting (from Alice’s side), and otherwise the outcome is random.
Using our XOR learning lemma for bits, and an analysis similar to the one in [CKS13], we can
show that
AOT = ACF and
√
BOT + 1
2
≥ BCF.
Kitaev’s lower bound for coin flipping [Kit03] states that
ACFBCF ≥ Pr[Alice and Bob honestly output 0].
In the case of imperfect coin flipping, we have that Alice and Bob both output either bit with
probability p/2 (since the protocol is aborted with probability 1− p). Therefore, we have
AOT
√
BOT + 1
2
≥ ACFBCF ≥ p
2
=⇒ AOT
(√
BOT + 1
)
≥ p,
proving Theorem 3.
In Appendix B, we construct a bit commitment protocol from an oblivious transfer protocol
and by our XOR learning lemmata and the bit commitment lower bounds in [CK11] we prove the
stronger lower bounds in Theorem 4.
4 Equivalences of secure oblivious transfer and CHSH
We give four reductions in order to prove Theorem 5, the reductions to prove Theorem 6 fol-
low similarly. We show the reduction from hidden XOR to secure, non-interactive oblivious
string transfer (1. =⇒ 2.); from secure, non-interactive oblivious string transfer to CHSHn
strategies (2. =⇒ 4.); from secure oblivious string transfer to hidden XOR (3. =⇒ 1.);
and from CHSHn to hidden XOR (4. =⇒ 1.). Since (2. =⇒ 3.) is obvious, we have
(1. =⇒ 2. =⇒ 3., 4. =⇒ 1.) allowing us to conclude all four statements are equivalent.
Hidden XOR to secure, non-interactive OTn
p
(1. =⇒ 2.): Let {ρx0,x1 : x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}n}
be a set of quantum states and {pix0,x1 : x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}n} be a probability distribution satisfying
the properties of statement 1 of Theorem 5. Alice chooses x0, x1 with probability pix0,x1 and sends
ρx0,x1 to Bob. Alice outputs
(z0, z1) := ((1− a)x0 + ax1 + d1, (1 − a)x1 + ax0 + d2)
where a is a randomly chosen bit and d1, d2 are independent randomly chosen bit strings. She
sends a, d1, d2 to Bob. The first bit randomizes the success probabilities for Bob (so he has an
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equal chance of learning z0 as for z1) and the d1, d2 bit strings ensure that Alice’s outcomes are
random. Bob picks a uniformly random bit b and measures to learn zb depending on a, d1, d2 from
Alice. In particular, we have
Pr[Bob learns zb] =
1
2
Pr[Bob learns zb|a = 0] + 1
2
Pr[Bob learns zb¯|a = 1]
=
1
2
Pr[Bob learns x0] +
1
2
Pr[Bob learns x1]
= p,
for b ∈ {0, 1}. Note that z0 ⊕ z1 = x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ d1 ⊕ d2 is hidden from Bob and Alice cannot learn
b, thus this protocol is secure.
Secure, non-interactive OTn
p
to CHSHn strategies (2. =⇒ 4.): Suppose there is a secure,
non-interactive OTnp protocol with correctness p. Without loss of generality,2 Alice and Bob share
the following classical-quantum state
∑
z0,z1∈{0,1}n
1
22n
|z0, z1〉〈z0, z1| ⊗ ρz0,z1 ,
for some quantum states ρz0,z1 that are in Bob’s private space B. Since Alice has no information
about b, the state sent by her is independent of b, hence Bob can use this state to decode either
of Alice’s strings. Let {M0z0}z0∈{0,1}n be Bob’s measurement to learn Alice’s first string and let
{M1z1}z1∈{0,1}n be his measurement to learn Alice’s second string. Since Bob can learn Alice’s
string with probability p, we have
p = Pr[Bob learns z0] =
∑
z0,z1∈{0,1}n
1
22n
〈M0z0 , ρz0,z1〉 (3)
p = Pr[Bob learns z1] =
∑
z0,z1∈{0,1}n
1
22n
〈M1z1 , ρz0,z1〉. (4)
Now consider any purifications |ψz0,z1〉 ∈ A ⊗ B of ρz0,z1 where A is a space controlled by
Alice. Let us define
|Ω〉 :=
∑
z0,z1∈{0,1}n
1
2n
|z0 ⊕ z1〉A1 |z0〉A2 |z1〉A3 |ψz0,z1〉AB,
|Ωx〉 to be the post-measured state assuming Alice measured A1 to get x, and let Bob’s reduced
state on B be ρx := TrA2A3A|Ωx〉〈Ωx|. We have that ρx = ρ0 for all x ∈ {0, 1}n since Bob has no
information about z0 ⊕ z1. By Uhlmann’s theorem, we have that for all x ∈ {0, 1}n, there exists
a unitary Ux acting on A2 ⊗ A3 ⊗ A such that (Ux ⊗ IB)|Ωx〉 = |Ω0〉. We can now define the
strategy for Alice and Bob to win the CHSHn game with probability p:
2For our purposes, we can assume Alice discards her quantum state except for the registers containing her values for
z0 and z1.
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• Alice and Bob share the state |Ω0〉 and receive random x ∈ {0, 1}n and y ∈ {0, 1}, respec-
tively.
• Alice applies (Ux)† such that Alice and Bob share the state |Ωx〉. She measures the space
A2 in the computational basis to get her outcome a.
• Bob applies the measurement {Myb }b∈{0,1}n on his space B to determine his outcome b.
We now analyze this strategy. Conditioned on Alice receiving x and outputting a, Bob has the state
TrA|ψa,x⊕a〉〈ψa,x⊕a| = ρa,x⊕a. If Bob gets y = 0, he must output b = a. If Bob gets y = 1, he
must output b = a⊕ x. The probability they win the CHSHn game with this strategy is
1
2
Pr[Bob learns a] + 1
2
Pr[Bob learns x⊕ a]
=
1
2
∑
x,a∈{0,1}n
1
22n
〈M0a , ρa,x⊕a〉+
1
2
∑
x,a∈{0,1}n
1
22n
〈M1x⊕a, ρa,x⊕a〉
= p,
from Equations (3) and (4).
Secure, interactive OTn
p
to hidden XOR (3. =⇒ 1.): Let |Ω〉AB be the final joint state of
the interactive OTnp protocol when Alice and Bob are honest. Suppose Alice measures to learn
(z0, z1) which are both distributed uniformly. Let ρz0,z1 be Bob’s post-measured state. We now
argue {ρz0,z1 : z0, z1} and pi being the uniform probability distribution satisfy the hidden XOR
condition. Since Alice does not abort because both parties have been honest, and the protocol is
secure, we know the XOR is hidden from Bob. It now suffices to describe a decoding procedure to
learn each zc, for c ∈ {0, 1}, with probability p.
We may assume Bob measures his part of the state |Ω〉AB (instead of decoding ρz0,z1) since it
does not matter if Alice measures before or after Bob. Suppose |Ωb〉AB is the post-measured joint
state when Bob partially measures |Ω〉AB to obtain his index b. Since Bob will not abort at this
stage and the protocol is secure, we know b is hidden from Alice. Again, by Uhlmann’s theorem,
we know that Bob can transform |Ω0〉 to |Ω1〉 and vice versa via a unitary acting on B. Hence Bob
can measure |Ω〉AB to learn b and collapse the state to |Ωb〉 and then apply the unitary mapping
|Ωb〉 to |Ωc〉. He then uses the decoding procedure of the OTnp protocol to learn zc with probability
p.
CHSHn strategies to hidden XOR (4. =⇒ 1.): Let |Ω〉AB be the state that Alice and Bob
share before receiving x and y in aCHSHn game strategy that succeeds with probability p. Suppose
Alice measures to learn a (conditioned on x). Let ρa,x be Bob’s post-measured state which occurs
with probability pia,x. We define the necessary states and probabilities by relabelling a → x0 and
x⊕a→ x1. Then, Bob has no information about x0⊕x1 = a⊕ (x⊕a) = x from non-signalling,
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and
1
2
Pr[Bob learns x0] +
1
2
Pr[Bob learns x1] =
1
2
Pr[Bob learns a] + 1
2
Pr[Bob learns x⊕ a] = p.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.
4.1 Applications of equivalences
As we have discussed in the introduction, our equivalences allow us to use results from one area to
prove new results in another area. More specifically, using our Hidden XOR lemmata, we provide
an alternative proof of the optimality of CHSH and an upper bound on CHSHn (Corollary 1)
and similar bounds for oblivious transfer (Corollary 2). In addition, using known results about
the CHSH game, we prove an alternative Hidden XOR lemma for n pairs of bits and a parallel
repetition result for secure oblivious transfer (Lemma 1 and Corollary 3).
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A Bounds on the complementarity of measurements
Let us assume for a quantum state |ψ〉 and two measurements {C, I−C} and {D, I−D}, that mea-
suring the state |ψ〉 with the measurement {C, I −C} yields the “correct” outcome C with proba-
bility cos2(α) and the “wrong” outcome I − C with probability sin2(α); and similarly, measuring
the state |ψ〉 with the measurement {D, I − D} yields the “correct” outcome D with probability
cos2(β) and the “wrong” outcome I −D with probability sin2(β).
We would like to study how the effect of performing the first measurement changes the infor-
mation we can extract through the second measurement. Two measurements are perfectly comple-
mentary, if after having performed the first measurement, no more information can be extracted
by performing the second measurement on the measured state. On the other hand, they are non
complementary if after measuring with one, the probabilities of the outcomes of the second are
unaffected (which is the case for classical measurements).
We provide a quantitative analysis for the case where the information is correctly decoded when
both measurements output the correct outcome or both output the wrong outcome (as for example,
in the case of trying to learn the XOR of two bits by decoding one after the other). Let us define Γ
as the following measure
Γ = ‖CD|ψ〉‖22+‖(I − C)(I −D)|ψ〉‖22−‖C|ψ〉‖22 ‖D|ψ〉‖22−‖(I −C)|ψ〉‖22 ‖(I −D)|ψ〉‖22 .
In the case of non complementary measurements, Γ = 0. By Claim 1, we have
|Γ| ≤ 1
2
sin(2β) sin(2α). (5)
Note that Γ can take both positive and negative values, since the act of performing the second mea-
surement on the post-measured state can increase or decrease the probability of correctly decoding.
The inequality (5) can be tight, since when C = D, we have Γ = 12 sin(2β) sin(2α) and when
C = I −D, we have Γ = −12 sin(2β) sin(2α).
B Lower bounds on the security of perfect oblivious transfers
We now define a bit commitment protocol where the commit phase is a perfect oblivious transfer
protocol and the reveal phase is classical.
Protocol 2 (Bit commitment from oblivious string transfer [CKS13])
1. Commit phase: Alice and Bob perform the OTn1 protocol such that Alice gets the output
(z0, z1) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n and Bob gets the output (b, w) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}n. Here, b is
the committed bit.
2. Reveal phase: If no one aborted, then Bob sends (b, w) to Alice.
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3. If (b, w) from Bob is inconsistent with (z0, z1) then Alice aborts. Otherwise, she accepts b as
the committed bit.
We have AOTn = ABC since both are equal to the amount Alice can learn b from the OTn1 pro-
tocol without Bob aborting. It is clear that Bob must send (c, zc) if he wants to reveal c. Therefore,
by letting q be the probability the OTn1 is not aborted by Alice using Bob’s optimal bit commitment
strategy, we have BBC = qc, where
c =
1
2
∑
b∈{0,1}
Pr[Bob can learn zb|Alice did not abort the OTn1 protocol].
From Theorem 1, we know that Bob has a strategy to learn (z0, z1) with probability
BOTn ≥ qc(2c − 1)2
noting that BBC ≥ 1/2 =⇒ c ≥ 1/2.
Fact 1 (Lower bound for bit commitment [CK11]) For any bit commitment protocol, there is a
parameter t ∈ [0, 1] such that
BBC ≥
(
1−
(
1− 1√
2
)
t
)2
and ABC ≥ 1
2
+
t
2
.
Using Fact 1, this yields the lower bound max{AOTn , BOTn} ≥ 0.5852, which is independent of
n. If n = 1, we can use the stronger bound in Theorem 1 to get
BOT ≥ q(2c − 1)2
improving the lower bound to max{AOT, BOT} ≥ 0.599.
C Technical Claims
Claim 2 Suppose θ, τ ∈ [0, pi/2] satisfy θ + τ ≤ pi/2. Then cos(θ + τ) ≥ cos2(θ) + cos2(τ)− 1.
Proof Without loss of generality, suppose that θ ≥ τ . Consider the function
f(θ) = cos(θ + τ)− cos2(θ)− cos2(τ) + 1
for fixed τ . Taking its derivative, we get f ′(θ) = − sin(θ+ τ) + sin(2θ), which is nonnegative for
θ ∈ [τ, pi/3 − τ/3] and nonpositive for θ ∈ [pi/3 − τ/3, pi/2 − τ ]. Note that τ ≤ pi/3 − τ/3 ≤
pi/2 − τ since τ ≤ pi/4. So we conclude that f is increasing on [τ, pi/3 − τ/3] and decreasing
on [pi/3 − τ/3, pi/2 − τ ]. Since f(τ) = 0 and f(pi/2 − τ) = 0, we have that f is positive
for θ ∈ [τ, pi/2 − τ ]. If θ, τ ∈ [0, pi/2] with θ + τ ≤ pi/2 and θ ≥ τ , we have exactly that
θ ∈ [τ, pi/2 − τ ]. We conclude from the positivity of f that cos(θ + τ) ≥ cos2(θ) + cos2(τ) − 1,
as desired. 
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Claim 3 Let θ, τ ∈ [0, pi2 ] satisfy cos2(θ)+cos2(τ) ≥ 1. Then cos(θ+τ) ≥ cos2(θ)+cos2(τ)−1.
Proof Since θ, τ ∈ [0, pi/2] satisfy cos2(θ) + cos2(τ) ≥ 1, we have
cos2(θ) + sin2(θ) = 1 ≤ cos2(θ) + cos2(τ) = cos2(θ) + sin2(pi/2− τ)
which gives directly θ ≤ pi/2− τ , or equivalently, θ+ τ ≤ pi/2. Claim 2 concludes the proof. 
D Bounding the value of CHSHn using semidefinite programming
We discuss the tightness of our bound on CHSHn, i.e., that
ω∗(CHSHn) ≤ 1
2
+
1√
2n+1
.
This was proven using an equivalence to a Hidden XOR condition and subsequently by our Hidden
XOR lemma. However, this is not the only way to bound the value of quantum games. For in-
stance, one can upper bound the value of two-player, one-round games using semidefinite program-
ming [KRT10]. We now compare our bound to the one given by semidefinite programs (SDPs).
We solved a relaxation3 of this SDP to get numerical upper bounds on the value of CHSHn for
n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. These values can be found in Table 1 along with the values from our proven
upper bound and the classical value lower bound.
Table 1: Bounds on the CHSHn game for n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Value n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5
Classical Value 0.7500 0.6250 0.5625 0.5312 0.5156
Conjectured Value 0.8535 0.7500 0.6767 0.6250 0.5883
SDP Relaxation 0.8535 0.7803 0.7437 0.7254 0.7163
Our Proven Bound 1 0.8535 0.7500 0.6767 0.6250
We can see that the SDP relaxation gives a tighter upper bound than ours for n ≤ 3, but the
numerical results suggest that our bound outperforms the SDP bound for larger values of n. This
implies that neither our bound nor the SDP one can be optimal for all n. In fact, we have the
following conjecture for the optimal value.
Conjecture 1 For every n ∈ N, the value of CHSHn is ω∗(CHSHn) = 12 + 12
√
1
2n .
This provides the correct value for n = 1 and is a stronger bound for all n. It remains open to
show whether our conjectured value is a lower and/or an upper bound on the value of CHSHn.
3This relaxation is faster to solve and gives the same numerical values as solving the semidefinite program for small
values of n.
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